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Abstract. Distributed system as e.g. artificial immune systems, com-
plex adaptive systems, or multi-agent systems are widely used in Com-
puter Science, e.g. for network security, optimisations, or simulations. In
these systems, small entities move through the network and perform cer-
tain tasks. At some time, the entities move to another place and require
therefore information where to move is most profitable. Common used
systems do not provide any information or use a centralised approach
where a center delegates the entities. This article discusses whether small
information about the neighbours enhances the performance of the over-
all system or not. Therefore, two information-protocols are introduced
and analysed. In addition, the protocols are implemented and tested us-
ing the artificial immune system SANA that protects a network against
intrusions.
1 Introduction
Distributed systems are widely used in computer science in order to solve prob-
lems distributed on several nodes. Examples are simulation or optimisation prob-
lems, which run on several nodes in parallel or the network security where a
network is secured against intrusion like e.g. viruses, worms, and trojans. These
distributed systems are e.g. multi-agent systems [1], complex adaptive systems
[2], and artificial immune systems [3,4,5]. These systems use small entities - e.g.
agents or artificial cells - that move through the network, perform certain tasks
for network security, and work mostly autonomously. These entities receive local
information about the situation in the network and contain a limited knowledge
about the overall goal - here secure a network against intrusions. An example
is that an entity knows how to identify one certain intrusion and receives the
status of the node where the entity resides [6]. The performance of the overall
systems originates from the performance of all the small entities, which leads to
waste of computational power and decreased performance of the overall system
when the entities are not properly distributed over all nodes.
A key problem in the distributed systems is that the entities work au-
tonomously and have to decide in some timestep whether they move to another
node and if yes to which node - this problem is part of the self-management of a
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distributed system. This problem is significant because the distributed security
system should secure the whole network and all nodes should have at least a cer-
tain number of entities. This article discusses whether exchanging a small piece
of information about the nearby situation increases the performance of the secu-
rity system or not - local information about a node with some additional global
information about the nearby region of the network. Therefore, two information
protocols describing how and which information is exchanged are introduced.
Thereafter, the two approaches are implemented in an artificial immune system
that uses autonomous artificial cells in order to secure a network against intru-
sions. Lastly, some discussions about the test results and the analysis conclude
the paper.
The domain of the application is network security. It describes the research in
order to secure a network against intrusions. Intrusions are e.g. viruses, worms,
and trojans. There are several approaches in order to secure a network against
intrusions, e.g. antivirus software, packet filters, and intrusion detection systems
[7]. Most of these common used security systems lack from the local installation
because then they only secure one network node and require lots of compu-
tational power to check the whole network traffic. Furthermore, the security
solutions for a network consist of several systems, e.g. antivirus software in each
node, packet filters in each router, and intrusion detection systems at the internet
gateway and email server. However, these systems are not connected and do not
work together. In order to protect a network against the upcoming intrusions,
a more sophisticated approach is required where an example are the distributed
systems. Thus, a distributed approach is chosen in the artificial immune system
SANA [4] where artificial cells perform the required tasks and build up a dis-
tributed intrusion detection system. These cells - the entities - move through the
network and require the information where to roam next. The next section intro-
duces the existing approaches for sharing movement information in distributed
systems.
2 Current situation
Currently, there are two different approaches in order to manage the movement
of the entities in a distributed system:
1. The entities do not work fully autonomously. A centralised system, which
knows the situation of the whole network, delegates the entities - mostly
agents - to their destinations. Thus, the system is again dependent on a
centralised system, which is also a single point of failure and is a contradiction
to the idea of a distributed system.
2. When the entities work fully autonomously, in most systems they receive no
information when and where to move. The movement is normally modelled
using some probabilistic events with a distribution over all neighbour nodes.
Both systems have significant disadvantages. The centralised approach re-
quires lots of bandwidth because the center needs information from all over the
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network and the center is a single point of failure. The distributed approach
reduces the bandwidth significantly but it is possible that the entities move to
inappropriate nodes where e.g., some nodes have too many entities and other
nodes suffer from the low number of entities. Consequently, this article discusses
how small pieces of information can help the entities to do the right decision.
3 Information Management and Protocols
For investigating research in the information management, the following situa-
tion in the network is assumed:
An artificial immune system [4] with lots of artificial cells - the entities - pro-
tects a network against intrusions [6]. Therefore, a type of artificial cell knows
how to detect and remove exactly one intrusion where there are several instances
of this type of artificial cells, cp. the immune cells in the human immune sys-
tem [8]. The whole system does not contain any centralised system and the
artificial cells decide autonomously when and where to move. The artificial im-
mune system presents each packet to all artificial cells in this node and the cells
decide whether the packet contains an intrusion or not. These cells should be
distributed over all nodes so that each node contains approximately the same
number of cells. In addition, the artificial immune system contains artificial cells
that move through the network and check the nodes whether they are infected
by an intrusion or not; e.g. in looking for backdoors or significant files and pro-
cesses on the node. These artificial cells require the information where to go
because the checks should be done uniformly in time distributed over all nodes;
this means that each node is checked regularly but not too often. This prob-
lem is the same as the general problem of the entities moving to another node.
The artificial cells are the entities and the infrastructure provides the required
resources for enabling the information management.
For the first problem - the movement of artificial cells that check packets -
the notification of insufficient security is introduced and for the second problem
- the movement of artificial cells that check nodes - the trails of entities is intro-
duced. In both approaches, the required resources must be limited. In the first
approach, only one network packet is at most required for each connection in the
network. The second approach requires only some storage in the network nodes
that depends on the number of different types of artificial cells. Furthermore,
the artificial cells receive some small pieces of information and, henceforth, do
not increase that much in size and complexity.
3.1 Notification of insufficient Security
In this approach, the problem of entities that check packets is discussed [9]. In
general, this approach can be used for all entities, which perform regularly cer-
tain tasks and which are required in lots of nodes of the network. The approach
is motivated by the cytokines and hormones of the humen immune system reg-
ulating the immune response and its immune cells motivate this approach [8].
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Fig. 1. Distribution of Notification: The node marked with N has an insufficient
security level and notifies this to its neighbours. The receiving time of this in-
formation is indicated using the colour of the nodes where the more black the
earlier the information arrives. The nodes without a colour do not receive the
information because they are too far away.
For detecting that a node n has an insufficient number of entities, it has a pa-
rameter that represents the minimum number of required security min secnode.
Each entity returns on demand how many security it provides: secentity. The
node n asks every time step all entities residing in this node how many security
each entity provides and sums this up: sectime =
∑
e∈entity node
sece; a weighted
sum for a more sophisticated calculation can be also used. If the security in this
time step is below the required security min secn > sectime, the node n starts
a notification process in order to allure nearby entities.
This notification works as follows:
1. Using local communication, the node informs the entities that are working in
this node about the insufficient security level. These entities are then more
affine to stay than to move. However, the entities are not forced to stay, they
still decide on their own.
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2. The node furthermore sends a network packet to all neighbours that indicate
the low security level and the packet also describes the missing level.
3. The nodes receiving this packet forwards it to all entities working in these
nodes. These entities then get more affine to move to this node than to stay
or to move to another node. The change of the affinity is dependent on the
level of lacking security that is stored in the packet.
4. With this workflow, each node maybe receives each time step several packets
describing insufficient security levels of several nodes. Therefore, the node
will forward only the packet with the highest missing security level.
5. In order to receive a global notification, each node forwards these notifica-
tion packets to their neighbours. The value describing the missing value is
therefore decreased by a decreasing function fd and if the value is still above
a threshold, the packet is forwarded to all neighbours with the decreased
value.
6. The notification about insufficient security in a node is not stored.
The distribution of the information that a node has insufficient security level is
visualised in figure 1.
The entities - here artificial cells - react to this information as follows. Each
entity has a function fm that describes the probability that it moves to an-
other node. Another function fw describes where the entity moves next. These
functions can have several parameters as the time the entity did not move, the
network load, and lacking security level. Therefore, each time step a probabilistic
event is done that succeeds with probability fm and if this event succeeds a sec-
ond probabilistic event using fw describes the node where the entity will move.
When the entity receives a notification that a node has an insufficient value, the
function fm will be increased in order to increase the affinity to move and the
second function fw is so changed that the entity will always move towards the
node with insufficient security. The function fm is visualised in figure 2.
This approach is implemented in the artificial immune system SANA that is
developed at the University of Luxembourg for the purpose of network security
(section 6). Each node with low security level sends the notification each time
step and the entities react to it. In the simulations, the functions are set as
follows:
– min secnode is set to 20 where there are 60 different types of artificial cells
in the artificial immune system
– secentity is the number of known intrusions, mostly 1
– the decreasing function fd is set to old value− 1
– if a node has an insufficient security level the artificial cells in this node will
not leave it
– the movement function fm is shown in figure 2
– the where to move function fw is only used if there is not any notification,
otherwise the entities move towards this node
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Fig. 2. Response function fm of an entity: fm(0) describe the normal affinity to
move; fm(x) describes the moving probability when lacking security x is received;
maximum limits response to prevent overreaction.
3.2 Trails of Entities
This approach provides information to entities performing regular checks in
nodes as identifying infected nodes. In general, the approach can be used for
entities performing a tasks that must be done regularly but not too often in a
node. Therefore, an approach is used that is motivated by artificial ant colonies
[10].
Each node n contains storage for each outgoing connection (v, w). In this
storage, for each type of entity e is a value stored vv,w,e that describes when
the last check took place. When an entity does a check in the node and moves
to the next node, it increases this value vv,w,e and every time step the node
decreases this value vv,w,e until it reaches zero. The entities in this node use this
information in order to evaluate where to move next.
Assume the following situation: an entity is in node n and finishes the check.
The next step is to move to another node and the entity receives information
when an entity of the same type moves to the neighbours, i.e. the values vv,w,e
for each (v, w) in n for type e. Then, it uses this information for a probabilistic
event where the Pr(move to neighbour ni) depends on the value that describes
when the node ni was lastly checked. In addition, the value is not a counting of
time steps. For the increasing of the value is a function fi and for the decrease
a function fd used. Then it is possible to when the last check did place at the
neighbouring node as well as how often in the past the node was checked by this
type of artificial cell. An example of fi is discussed in figure 3.
This approach is also implemented in the artificial immune system where the
storage uses float-values. The increasing function fi is set to c1+c2·exp(old value)
with c1 and c2 as a constant value, e.g. c1 = 10 and c2 = 11000 . The decreasing
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function fd is set to old value − c3 where c3 is a constant value, e.g. 2. Thus,
the value increases exponentially and decreases linearly. The probabilistic event
sets the probability for each node dependent on the required security in the
neighbour nodes.
4 Testing Results
As already explained, the two techniques are implemented in an artificial im-
mune system. The simulations are done using a network simulator implementing
a packet-switching network. The network is a company-like network with about
500 nodes with different server, workstations, and services. An Internet gateway
connects the network to the Internet and different intrusions are implemented,
which are mostly viruses, worms, and trojans arriving over the network or di-
rectly by internal attacks. The results are discussed in the next two subsections:
4.1 Notification of insufficient Security
The notification of insufficient security works more than acceptable. When the
parameters and functions are chosen properly, the system adapts quickly so that
nodes with insufficient security receive artificial cells quickly. Furthermore, the
system does not overreact which means that the artificial cells react too heavily
and all cells move immediately to a node with insufficient security. Then, the
alternating status is prevented: this means that all cells oscillate between two
nodes because one of these two nodes has always an insufficient security level.
The required resources are limited. For each connection is exactly one net-
work packet for each time step used. The required computational power is also
limited because the processing of the information is quite fast. The performance
increase of the artificial immune system is observed. The performance with no-
tification of insufficient security levels is significant higher than in the version
without enabled notification. For example in one scenario, about 80% of the
intrusions are identifies without the usage of the notification system; this low
value occurs because some nodes have too much and some nodes too few artificial
cells. When the notification system is enabled, the system identifies about 98%
of the intrusions because all nodes have a guaranteed security value. Compared
to the centralised approach with an entity management server, the notification
of insufficient security requires about 80% less bandwidth and the performance
increases by 15% due to the quicker adaption to weak points in the network.
The reason for this is that the system quickly solves security problems and the
attackers cannot use nodes with insufficient security in order to install intrusions.
Additionally, the system distributes the artificial cells in a better way. If there is a
node with too many artificial cells that requires too much computational power,
there are also nodes with insufficient security and the artificial cells will solve this
problem using the information. Furthermore, it is possible to adapt the system
to the current situation using changes of the parameters. In addition, important
nodes are secured with more entities, which is configured through changes in the
notification system.
7
Fig. 3. Trails: an entity in the left node wants to move, reads therefore the trails,
and receives the values indicating the trail. Thereafter, it makes a probabilistic
event where it chooses uniformly a number from [1, 289]. If the number is in
[1, 100] it moves to the node with trail value 1. Else, if the number is in [101, 197],
it moves to the node with trail value 5. Else, if the number is in [198, 288], it
moves to the node with trail value 10. Else, if the number is 289, it moves to the
node with trail value 100. This probabilistic event reflects the trail values of the
neighbouring nodes.
4.2 Trails of Entities
The trails of entities work well. The system provides information to the entities
where their tasks are required and the entities move there. The entities also save
computational power because between two checks is a certain time period. In
our simulations, without the trails only about 70% of the nodes are checked and
some nodes are very often checked about every second time-step. With the trails
systems, all nodes are regularly checked and too often checks are successfully
prevented where the required computational power is reduced by 60%.
Unfortunately, when the network is fragmented in several parts and these
parts are connected by a few connections, the trails of entities do not work
properly. The reason for this is that many entities must use these connections,
they receive a high value, and the probability to move over these connections
is reduced. Fortunately, this problem can be solved in using other functions in
these nodes: one solution is to use a decreasing function with a significant higher
gradient or to not use the trails in this node, which results to a probability of
1
#neighbours for all neighbours.
5 Analysis
In the analysis of the two techniques, the focus lays on the question how the
selected information helps the entities and what other information might be
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interesting. In addition, the required resources are analysed and a balancing be-
tween these two parameters are done.
Definition: Local information comes from the network node and is not sent over
the network. Global information describes the situation in another node and is
sent over the network.
Question: Are the information locally or globally?
In the notification of insufficient security, the information is local and global
because the entities receive the information from the neighbouring nodes directly
and using forwarding from nodes that are nearby. However, using feasible pa-
rameters, the entities do not receive information about insufficient security in
nodes that are far away. The reason for this is that if they receive information
about all nodes with insufficient security, the required resources are equal to
the centralised approaches. Using the parameters, it is possible to trade off the
proportion between the required bandwidth and the distance where information
are forwarded.
In the trails of entities, the information is locally. There is no exchange be-
tween the nodes about this information and the entities receive only the infor-
mation of a node.
Question: Does information that is more global increase the performance?
In the notification of insufficient security, using the parameters it is possible
to choose between required bandwidth and global information. However, when
the system is so configured that the cells receive information about all nodes with
insufficient security, the entities receive too many information and will travel too
often through the network. Furthermore, it is uninteresting that an entity moves
through the whole network only to fix a problem at a far-away node. Then it
is more interesting to solve the problem in the area around the node where
only localised information is required. The tests showed that a local setting
with a distribution of some hops results in the best performance and limits the
bandwidth greatly. In addition, the distribution area of the notification depends
on the missing security value: the bigger the missing security level, the greater
is the distribution area, which is a more adaptive approach.
In the trails of entities, some global information would increase the perfor-
mance. Especially in the situation explained in the last section that connections
with high load will not be traversed by entities, a view to other nodes would
make the decision of an entity where to move more sophisticated. Then, the en-
tities would receive a more global view about the nearby network. However, then
the system must invest more bandwidth and the selection which information to
store in which node is quite difficult.
Question: Which other information are interesting to use for these two problems?
For the protocol of notification of insufficient security, it would be interesting
to know how many artificial cells are on the way towards this node. Furthermore
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it would be interesting to receive information about more than one node so
that the system does not only adapt to the node which has the highest value
of lacking security value. However, both would implicate lots of bandwidth and
high storage space for saving the information. Furthermore, the workflow in the
entities would be more complex.
For the protocol of trails of entities, it would be interesting to receive infor-
mation about a part of a network and not only from the neighbours of this node.
However, this would again increase the required bandwidth and storage space.
Question: Which other problems occur in the self-management of a distributed
security system?
In the notification of insufficient security, the following questions are also of
interest:
– Which node has too many entities. Too many entities is defined so that the
resources - mainly computational power - is not sufficient with the required
resources from all entities. It is highly interesting that these entities move to
the nodes with insufficient security level in order to balance the system.
– Is it possible to design moving chains where several entities move from node
to node and after one time step all nodes have a sufficient security level?
If yes, which information is required so that all entities can initiate this
moving?
For the trails of entities, the following questions are also interesting:
– How to use these trails so that not too many checks are performed on a node?
If too many checks are performed simultaneous, the node has to invest too
much computational power.
– Is it maybe possible to use these trails in order to find nodes that are con-
trolled by an intrusion in absorbing cells? The problem in distributed security
systems is that an attacker occupies a node and has access to the security
systems. Then, the attacker can remove all incoming entities and after some
time the system will lack of too few entities. The system can analyse the
trail values in the nodes that are nearby the infected node and maybe there
are association between an occupied node and trail values.
These questions will be the challenges for the future research in distributed
self management of distributed security systems.
6 Applications
Currently, the information management is used in the artificial immune system
SANA, which protects a network against intrusions [9,11]. Therefore, SANA fa-
cilitates lots of small artificial cells performing autonomously the tasks required
for network security - the organic computing approach. Common used secu-
rity components like antivirus softwares, firewalls, packet filters, and intrusion
detection systems complement the system to benefit from their performance.
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The artificial cell communication enables the collaboration between the different
artificial cells where the infrastructure supplies the cells with additional informa-
tion. The artificial lymph nodes implement a meeting and response point for a
small part of the network and the central nativity and training stations generate
and release continuously novel artificial cells including the newest security tech-
niques. With the specialised artificial cells is it possible to implement nearly all
approaches of network security. The in this article introduced self management
organises the cells so that the system is always properly secured and there is no
weak point in the network. The information management is more sophisticated
implemented where the security components and artificial cells exchange con-
tinuously status information in order to adapt the overall system and internal
thresholds as well as parameters - implementation of the danger theory [12] and
the tunable activation threshold [13] of the immune cells. For the response when
an intrusion is found, the components develop a defense strategy and perform
this or quarantine the node with informing the administrator for further tasks.
Maintenance - updates, extensions, and regular self-checks - are performed by
the system using specialised cells where the maintenance is automated and not
proper working as well as outdated components are reported to the administra-
tor. However, the administrator is able to access and configure all nodes and
components of the system through an administration GUI. Infected nodes are
identified through regular checks as well as through distributed analysis of data
gathered by various security components, i.e. the distributed analysis of network
packets through intrusion detection systems and artificial cells [6]. Due tos the
usage of common used components, the performance is at least as good as of
common used security systems. Due to the dynamic artificial cells is the system
hard to predict and to attack, contains no single point of failure, and adapts
to the current situation in the network. In addition, a real distributed intru-
sion detection system is implemented in all nodes with simplified administration
workflows [9].
Furthermore, the notification of low security can be used in nearly all dis-
tributed systems where the number of entities can be measured and thereafter
modeled using the parameters and functions. The trails can be used in all scenar-
ios where a type of entity should visit all nodes regularly but not too frequently.
These systems are most distributed systems as the multi-agent systems, the mas-
sively distributed systems, complex adaptive systems, and the artificial immune
systems.
7 Conclusion
This article discusses two information protocols for distributed systems and
analyses the performance. The two protocols increase the performance of a dis-
tributed system enormously because the entities receive information where their
tasks are required. In addition, the required bandwidth is limited because a cen-
tralised system is not used. The next steps are to introduce more information
protocols and evaluate theoretically how the performance would increase when
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more bandwidth is invested. Furthermore, the enhancing of the distributed se-
curity systems that base on the artificial immune system as archetype is a next
step.
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